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Abstract I  defend  the  argument  that  if  embryo  loss  in  stem  cell  research  is 
morally problematic, then embryo loss in in vivo conception is similarly morally 
problematic.  According  to  a  recent  challenge  to  this  argument,  we  can 
distinguish between in vivo embryo loss and the in vitro embryo loss of stem cell  
research  by  appealing  to  the  Doctrine  of  Double  Effect.  I  argue  that  this 
challenge fails to show that in vivo embryo loss is a mere unintended side-effect 
while in vitro embryo loss is an intended means and that, even if we refine the 
challenge  by  appealing  to  Michael  Bratman’s  three  roles  of  intention,  the 
distinction is still unwarranted. 
Stem cell research is sometimes criticised on the grounds that the embryo loss that it causes 
is morally problematic (1, 2). A standard reply to this charge is to point out that embryo loss 
is  also  involved  in  the  mundane  practice  of  trying  to  conceive  and  conceiving  children 
through sexual  intercourse (3,  4,  5).  According to this  argument,  if  stem cell  research is  
ethically  problematic because of  its embryo loss,  then trying to conceive and conceiving 
children through sexual  intercourse  is  similarly  ethically  problematic;  but  since trying to 
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conceive and conceiving children is obviously not ethically problematic – or so this argument  
goes, stem cell research is also not ethically problematic. 
Recently the disjunctive premise of this argument in defence of stem cell research has been 
challenged  by  application  of  the  Doctrine  of  Double  Effect  (DDE)  (6).  According  to  this 
challenge,  by  appealing  to  double  effect  one  can  distinguish  between  the  embryo  loss 
involved in stem cell  research and the embryo loss involved in the mundane practice of  
trying to conceive and conceiving children through sexual intercourse. DDE could then be 
used to morally justify the latter but not the former. The idea is, in short, the following: both 
in  vivo  conception  and  stem  cell  research  involve  embryo  loss.  But  embryo  loss  is  an  
intended  means  of  stem  cell  research  while  embryo  loss  is  only  a  merely  foreseen 
unintended side-effect in the case of in vivo conception. 
DDE says that, in pursuing the good, we may sometimes bring about some evil as long as  
such evil is not intended and as long as such evil is not out of proportion with the good we 
are pursuing.i So merely foreseen unintended evil can, under certain conditions, be morally 
justifiable; while intended evil can never be morally justifiable. If embryo loss is intended evil  
in stem cell research then, according to DDE, it cannot be morally justifiable. And if embryo  
loss is a merely foreseen unintended side-effect in in vivo conception, then it can be morally  
justifiable as long as the evil involved in embryo loss is proportional to the good involved in  
the conception of children. Murphy (6) argues exactly along these lines that embryo loss in  
in vivo conception is not an intended means; that in vivo conception is driven by the good 
i This is a simplification of the classic four conditions: “A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees 
will produce a good and a bad effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time: 1)  
that the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent; 2) that the good effect and not the  
evil effect be intended; 3) that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect; 4) that there be a  
proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect” (7).
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intention  to  procreate;  and  that  the  embryo  loss  involved  is  proportional  to  the  good 
represented by procreation. 
1. Murphy’s argument
Here I argue against this appeal to DDE in two steps: I first show the failings of Murphy’s  
particular  argument and then I  offer  a  more general  critique of  appeals  to DDE. I  leave 
Murphy’s  discussion  of  IVF  to  the  side,  as  it  has  already  been  criticised  elsewhere  (8).  
Murphy’s discussion is divided in three parts, reflecting three classic elements of DDE: the 
value  of  the  intention  and  action  in  itself;  the  intended  means  as  opposed  to  merely 
foreseen side-effects distinction; and proportionality. Here I argue that his discussion of each 
of these three elements is defective.
A. First of all I take issue with Murphy`s claim that “The intention to have children is not, 
therefore, morally disqualified in itself” (6) on the grounds that “for most of human history, 
the scope of zygote and embryo loss would have been unknowable to people trying to have 
children. Earlier human beings would not have even been able to link the two effects into a 
single motive” (6). This talk of action in itself and intention in itself (which is characteristic of 
DDE, see Mangan’s already quoted first condition requiring “that the action in itself from its 
very object be good or at least indifferent” (7)) is too permissive: that a morally questionable  
effect of an action (in this case, embryo loss) has been previously unknown cannot be a 
justification for the ‘action in itself’ or ‘intention in itself’ even after the morally questionable 
effect  has  been  established.  After  we  found  out  that  Thalidomide caused  very  serious 
physical malformations, then the act or intention of prescribing  Thalidomide was morally 
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disqualified in itself. This suggests that we should abandon this part of DDE and focus only 
on the distinction between intended and merely foreseen and on the issue of proportionality 
– and this move has indeed become standard amongst contemporary commentators (9, 10, 
11, 12).
B. Murphy claims that “the death of some embryos is not inherently a condition of success 
for conception in vivo that results in children, so that we cannot treat efforts to achieve 
conception in vivo as involving a necessary evil used as the means to a good end” (6); this is 
because  “Some  conception,  implantation  and  gestation  occur  without  loss  of  zygotes, 
embryos or fetuses” (6). This is a misunderstanding of the conception of ‘means’ in the DDE 
debate. Whether or not something counts as an intended means is not a mind-independent 
matter  of  extensional  necessity:  it  is  a  purely  intensional  matter.  Being  extensionally 
necessary  is  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  to  being  an  intended  means.  It  can’t  be 
sufficient, quite obviously, because that something is extensionally necessary does not imply  
that it is intended. And it isn’t necessary either: take one of the classic cases of impermissible 
intended means in the DDE debate, Terror Bomber (13, 14). ii Terror Bomber intends to kill 
ii As I refer to this influential case more than once in my discussion, let me remind the reader of its structure:  
“Both Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the goal of promoting the war effort against Enemy. Each  
intends to pursue this goal by weakening Enemy, and each intends to do that by dropping bombs. Terror  
Bomber’s plan is to bomb the school in Enemy’s territory, thereby killing children of Enemy and terrorizing  
Enemy’s population. Strategic Bomber’s plan is different. He plans to bomb Enemy’s munitions plant, thereby  
undermining Enemy’s war effort. Strategic Bomber also knows, however, that next to the munitions plant is a  
school, and that when he bombs the plant he will also destroy the school, killing the children inside. Strategic  
Bomber has not ignored this fact. Indeed, he has worried a lot about it. Still, he has concluded that this cost,  
though significant, is outweighed by the contribution that would be made to the war effort by the destruction 
of the munitions plant. Now, Terror Bomber intends all of the features of his action just noted: he intends to  
drop the bombs, kill the children, terrorize the population, and thereby weaken Enemy. In contrast, it seems  
that  Strategic Bomber  only  intends to drop the bombs,  destroy the munitions plant,  and weaken Enemy.  
Although he knows that by bombing the plant he will be killing the children, he does not, it seems, intend to kill  
them. Whereas killing the children is, for Terror Bomber, an intended means to his end of victory, it is, for  
Strategic Bomber,  only something he knows he will  do by bombing the munitions plant.  Though Strategic  
Bomber has taken the deaths of the children quite seriously into account in his deliberation, these deaths are 
for him only an expected side effect; they are not – in contrast with Terror Bomber’s position – intended as a  
means... In saying this I do not deny that Strategic Bomber kills the children intentionally” (13).  
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the school children in order to demoralize the enemy. Killing the school children is Terror  
Bomber’s intended means to her end of demoralizing the enemy. But that does not mean 
that killing school children is necessary to demoralizing the enemy (even though it may be 
sufficient):  there  are  plenty  alternative  ways  of  demoralizing  the  enemy  which  do  not 
involve killing school children. All the same, killing school children is an intended means even 
if it is not extensionally necessary. 
Also,  extensional  necessity  cannot  be  the  right  criterion  because  it  does  not  distinguish 
between intended means and merely foreseen side-effects. In both scenarios of the Trolley 
Problem,  Bystander at the Switch and  Fat Man (another  classic of  the DDE debate),  the 
death of the one is extensionally necessary. But that is not taken to mean that in both cases  
the death of the one is an intended means, as the Trolley Problem was developed exactly to 
illustrate the distinction between intended means and merely foreseen side-effects that DDE 
is found on. To further illustrate how implausible Murphy’s proposal  is,  imagine that we 
could finally  effectively  conduct stem cell  research without  destroying  embryos but  that 
some scientists deliberately continued to destroy embryos. Murphy’s conception would here 
deliver the weird outcome that those scientists would now be allowed to destroy embryos 
because the embryo loss would no longer be extensionally necessary while they would have 
been  previously  not  allowed  –  namely  the  very  opposite  verdict  that  one  would  have 
reasonably expected even from Murphy’s own point of view.
C.  As we said, for a defense of in vivo embryo loss through DDE, one needs the bad effect 
(embryo  loss)  to  be  proportional  to  the  good  effect  (procreation).  And  indeed  Murphy 
argues that the bad of embryo loss is not out of proportion with the good of having children. 
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This, indeed, does not sound implausible on the face of it. But rather than considering this 
point at face value, we should see that the defense of in vivo embryo loss through DDE is a  
step in an argument against embryo loss in stem cell research. And that wider argument is  
funded on the premise that embryos are either persons or potential persons or anyway near 
enough to  persons  to  be  deserving  of  some moral  status.  This  premise  is  very  clear  in 
Murphy’s  argument too: “In the discussion that follows, I  will  treat all  conceived human 
organisms  as  persons”  (6).  So  embryos,  at  least  for  the  sake  of  the  argument  under 
discussion, are persons.iii But if embryos are indeed persons, then it is not at all clear that the 
DDE proportionality condition will be met. Murphy cites two different estimates on in vivo 
embryo loss, and according to both the number of embryos who die in the course of in vivo 
conception is greater than the number of children who are born (3, 19).  If  embryos are  
persons (and babies too), then according to these estimates in vivo conception kills more 
persons than it gives birth too. This is obviously still different from the claim that in vivo 
conception kills  more person than it  creates – as that claim is necessarily false if  all  are 
thought to be persons. Still, the sacrifice of persons involved in in vivo conception is, on this  
argument, very great: this practice kills more persons than it does not kill, for example. iv It 
iii Here I do not discuss the issue of personhood and related questions in the abortion debate about the status  
of embryos and foetuses; but I have done so elsewhere (15, 16, 17, and 18). 
iv Here I don’t mean to argue that the sacrifice involved would be obviously immoral but only that it is not  
obvious  that  the  proportionality  condition  would  be  met  because  the  sacrifice  is  very  significant.  An  
anonymous referee pointed out to me, for example, that even if more persons died prematurely after birth  
than did not die prematurely after birth, we would still think it was worth creating persons, at least if there was 
no alternative.  I  am not sure about this:  could we really justify  such great  sacrifice of  persons? Could we 
legitimately conceive and bring to bear a baby knowing that her chances of after-birth long term survival would  
be less than 50%? How many potential parents would still do that? Also, maybe it would still be worth creating 
persons to avoid the extinction of humanity but the practice would nonetheless be immoral: the survival of the  
human kind must not be necessarily reduced to an ethical issue. These remarks are not meant to be conclusive  
but only to clarify that the proportionality condition is not at all obvious in in vivo conception. And normally in  
double effect  cases  the proportionality  condition is  very obvious,  as in  the five against  one of  the trolley  
problem. 
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will not do, here, to propose that one drop the premise according to which embryos are 
persons.  Because  once  that  premise  is  dropped,  then  the  argument  against  stem  cell 
research  that  DDE is  supposed to  defend no longer  holds  –  at  least  in  the  form under 
discussion.v 
2. Double Effect
So far I have only argued that Murphy’s particular appeal to DDE is problematic. That does 
not mean, it will be objected, that one cannot appeal to DDE at all. In the rest of this article I 
look at alternative possible appeals to DDE, arguing that the problem is the Doctrine itself 
and not simply its application to embryo loss. We have shown the problems with Murphy’s  
attempt to argue that the embryo loss involved in in vivo conception is not intended while 
the  embryo  loss  involved  in  stem  cell  research  is  intended:  his  appeal  to  extensional 
necessity  misrepresents  DDE.   What  could  we  rather  appeal  to  in  order  to  distinguish 
between intended means and merely foreseen side-effects? 
Here is a more promising  classic suggestion from Michael  Bratman,  who identifies three 
roles  for  intention:  (i)  ‘posing  problems  for  further  reasoning’,  (ii)  ‘constraining  other 
intentions’, and (iii) ‘issuing in corresponding endeavouring’ (13).vi Terror Bomber’s intention 
v On the issue of proportionality, see also Devolder’s already mentioned forthcoming critique of Murphy (8).  
Here I don’t have the space to take issue with Devolder’s critique as well as with Murphy’s argument, so I limit  
my discussion to the latter. Let me just say that my critique is more radical than Devolder’s in two crucial  
respects: firstly, it goes at the heart of the application of double effect to embryo debates and the supposed  
distinction between in vivo and in vitro in challenging the idea of unintended in vivo versus intended in vitro,  
and not just the issue of proportionality; secondly, my argument challenges the use of double effect in this 
debate in general and not just Murphy’s particular application. 
vi Here I just use Bratman’s planning theory of intention rather than critically engaging with it. I have discussed  
Bratman on intention at length elsewhere (20, 21, and 22). 
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will (i) pose the problem of how he is going to kill the children: “Terror Bomber must figure 
out, for example, what time of day to attack and what sorts of bombs to use” (13). (ii) Terror  
Bomber’s intention will also be incompatible with other possible strategies. Terror Bomber 
may not, for example, implement a plan to deploy some troops if this deployment would 
result in the enemy evacuating the children: “So Terror Bomber’s prior intention to kill the  
children stands in the way of his forming a new intention to order the troop movement (13).  
(iii) Terror Bomber will also guide his conduct so as to cause the death of the children: “If in 
midair he learns they have moved to a different school, he will try to keep track of them and 
take his bombs there” (13). 
Those roles, on the other hand, do not apply, according to Bratman, to Strategic Bomber’s  
attitude towards killing the children: Strategic Bomber will not engage in practical reasoning 
about  how  to  kill  the  children;  if  further  intentions  of  Strategic  Bomber  should  be 
incompatible with killing the children,  that will  not be a prima facie reason to disregard  
them; and, to put the point crudely, if the children move, Strategic Bomber will not follow 
them.
Similarly, a couple trying to conceive through sexual intercourse will not engage in practical  
reasoning about how to kill embryos; if their further intentions should be incompatible with 
killing embryos, that will be no reason to disregard those intentions; and, finally, if for some 
reason the embryos appear to be surviving, the couple has no reason to react to this turn of 
events. Indeed, the couple will normally not be in a position to monitor whether or not there 
is  embryo loss;  and the fact  that  this  state of affairs  makes no difference to the couple  
suggests that indeed they are indifferent to embryo loss and therefore that they do not 
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intend embryo loss. The problem is that we can say the same of the stem cell researcher:  
should embryos somehow survive her research intact, she will not ‘go after them’. Similarly,  
the researcher  will  have  no reason to  disregard  intentions  which  are  incompatible  with 
killing embryos; and the researcher will not engage in practical reasoning about how to kill  
embryos. So this analysis of intention does not warrant the claim that in vivo conception 
does not involve the intention to kill embryos while stem cell research does. 
Here it could be objected that the latter claims misrepresent the empirical facts about how 
stem cell research is conducted, and that because of the way in which stem cell research is 
conducted a stem cell  researcher does indeed need to,  for  example,  engage in practical  
reasoning about how to kill embryos. So let us then look in some more detail at how stem 
cell research works:
HESCs are derived in vitro around the fifth day of the embryo's development. A 
typical day-5 human embryo consists of 200-250 cells, most of which comprise 
the  trophoblast,  which  is  the  outermost  layer  of  the  blastocyst.  HESCs  are 
harvested from the inner cell  mass of the blastocyst,  which consists of 30-34 
cells. The derivation of HESC cultures requires the removal of the trophoblast. 
This process of disaggregating the blastocyst's cells eliminates its potential for 
further development. (19)
Let us remember that we are assuming that embryos are persons. On that assumption, an 
opponent to stem cell research could compare the above procedure to removing vital organs 
from an adult human being in order to save the life of many other adult human beings and 
then ask whether it  would be at  all  plausible,  in this  alternative case,  to  claim that  the  
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surgeon who removes the vital organs did not intend the death of the adult human being in 
question. The idea being that it is preposterous to claim that the surgeon did not intend to 
kill the person from which she is removing vital organs. But let us put that to the test of the  
three roles of intention: does the surgeon need to engage in practical reasoning about how 
to kill the adult human being in question? No, she only needs to deliberate about how to  
remove the required organs. Will the surgeon kill the adult human being in case the patient 
would miraculously survive the successful removal of the required organs? No she wouldn’t 
because she is only interested in the organs. Yes, but the surgeon knows that the patient will  
die. That’s true, but let us not forget that this epistemic condition does not distinguish the 
two cases: we know that there will be embryo loss in in vivo conception too.vii 
Indeed, the in vivo conception case seems to be even worse, like if our surgeon would have 
to perform lethal surgery on various different people before she got the one whose organs 
will do the job. Similarly, a couple will have to cause the loss of various embryos before one 
develops into a foetus and then a child. Indeed, there is another disanalogy between in vivo  
conception  and  the  original  surgeon  which,  again,  does  not  reflect  well  on  in  vivo 
conception. Not all embryo loss caused by in vivo conception will ultimately result in a baby 
(couples may give up, split up, die, etc.): this is as if the surgeon would perform the lethal 
surgery many times without even being sure that she will finally get the passing organs. 
vii An anonymous referee for this  journal  has suggested to me that  one moral  difference between in vivo  
conception and the transplant case may be that each of the embryos receives the best chance at survival while  
the patient from whom we take the organs stands no chance to survive. Coming out of the transplant analogy,  
the idea would be that an embryo in stem cell research stands no chance to survive while each of the embryos  
receives the best chance to survive in in vivo conception. The problem here is that this suggestion alters the  
necessary epistemic balance between the two cases by suggesting that death is only sure in one case but not in  
the other. But across cases the number of deaths must be supposed to be equal and therefore the probability  
of death in the one case must also be equal between the two scenarios. 
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It  may  be  objected  that  showing  that  we  can’t  effectively  distinguish  between  in  vivo 
conception and stem cell research by appeal to DDE is not enough, because there may be 
other ways, independent of DDE, to draw that distinction. This point would bring us too far  
from the  topic  of  this  paper,  but  I  want  to  briefly  discuss  at  least  the  most  important  
alternative,  the  distinction  between  actions  and  omissions  and  the  related  distinction 
between killing and letting die. On this interpretation, one would argue that only the stem 
cell researcher kills embryos while a couple trying to have children does not kill embryos – 
merely letting embryos die. But I really can’t see how one could defend this position in this  
particular case, whatever one thinks about its general merits: the couple freely and actively 
engages in an activity that she knows will cause the death of embryos the same way in which 
the researcher freely and actively engages in an activity that she knows will cause the death 
of embryos. Both are clear cases of action rather than omission. 
In conclusion, I have defended the argument that if the embryo loss involved in stem cell  
research  is  morally  problematic,  then the embryo loss  involved  in  in  vivo  conception  is  
similarly morally problematic. I have argued that appeals to the Doctrine of Double Effect fail  
to make a case for a morally relevant distinction between embryo losses in the two cases 
because one cannot make sense of the distinction between intended embryo loss in stem 
cell  research and merely foreseen embryo loss in in vivo conception.  Importantly,  I  have 
presented  a  general  challenge  to  the  distinction  between  intended  harm  and  merely 
foreseen harm in general and not only a challenge to its particular application to this one 
case.viii 
viii As a general challenge to double effect, this has admittedly been very brief and quick. But I have challenged  
the Doctrine of Double Effect in much more detail elsewhere (23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28).
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